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EQUAL PROTECTION FOR ILLEGITIMATE
CHILDREN: THE SUPREME COURT'S
STANDARD FOR DISCRIMINATION
MARTHA T.

ZINGO*

I. INTRODUCTION

Between 1968 and 1980 the Supreme Court decided twenty cases'
involving statutory classifications based on illegitimacy. The Court's decisions have determined whether discrimination against those individuals
deemed illegitimate by law 2 constitutes a denial of equal protection.
When these decisions are analyzed it seems apparent that the Court was
experiencing some difficulty in determining the appropriate constitutional test to apply to illegitimacy statutes. It is not surprising that the
Court's various rulings appear inconsistent.
The purpose of this article is to examine the Supreme Court's inconsistent decisions in its equal protection analysis of laws affecting illegitimate children. To accomplish this goal, it is necessary first to consider
the decisions of the Court; second, to identify the constitutional tests employed; and third, to investigate the stance advocated by each Supreme
Court and its significance. This article will demonstrate, through statistical analysis, the voting patterns of each individual justice on this issue. It
follows that legislators can predict, with a fair degree of accuracy,
whether a law affecting illegitimate children will withstand a constitutional challenge. This article concludes that the Court should apply
strict, rather than intermediate scrutiny. Strict scrutiny would afford full
* Instructor, Dept. of Government and Politics, University of Maryland. B.A. 1975, University
of Delaware; M.S. 1979, Drexel University.
I United States v. Clark, 445 U.S. 23 (1980); Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282 (1979); Caban v.
Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S.
259 (1978); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977); Trimble v.
Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976); Weinberger v. Beaty, 418 U.S.
901 (1974), aff'g 478 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1973); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974); New
Jersey Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535
(1973); Richardson v. Griffen, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972), aff'g 346 F. Supp. 1226 (D. Conn. 1972);
Richardson v. Davis, 409 U.S. 1069, affig 342 F. Supp. 588 (D. Conn. 1972); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Labine v. Vincent,
401 U.S. 532 (1971); Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968);
Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
2 An illegitimate child is one whose parents were not married at the time of his or her birth.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 673 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). This term serves no positive purpose: it stigmatizes the labeled children, it makes them the object of malice, and it devalues their worth as
persons. Throughout this paper, however, the term is used for the sake of clarity, uniformity, and
reader convenience.
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predictability to lawmakers, and consistently protect illegitimate children
against invidious discrimination.
The Supreme Court addresses the constitutionality of laws discriminating against illegitimate persons in terms of the due process clause of
the 5th amendment 3 and the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment. If a federal statute is the subject of the constitutional challenge,
then the 5th amendment is utilized; if the constitutionality of a state statute is questioned, then the 14th amendment applies. Since the Court did
not appraise any federal statutes concerning illegitimate persons in terms
of the equal protection clause until 1968, the 14th amendment initially
guided the Court's decisions.
II. CASES

The first two illegitimacy cases to be subjected to equal protecton
consideration during the time period were Levy v. Louisiana4 and Glona
v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Company.' Both cases
center on the Louisiana Wrongful Death Statute, which allows the heirs
6
of an injured party to recover damages if the injured party dies.
In Levy, the appellant, on behalf of five illegitimate children, sued to
recover damages for the wrongful death of their mother. The appellate
3 "Although there is no specific equal protection guarantee applicable to the federal government, equal protection standards have been imported into the due process clause of the fifth amendment." Davis, 342 F. Supp. at 591.
4 Levy, 391 U.S. 68.
5 Glona, 391 U.S. 73.
6 Article 2315 states:
Every act whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it
happened to repair it.
The right to recover damages to property caused by an offense or quasi offense is a
property right which, on the death of the obligee, is inherited by his legal, instituted, or
irregular heirs, subject to the community rights of the surviving spouse.
The right to recover all other damages caused by an offense or quasi offense, if the
injured person dies, shall survive for a period of one year from the death of the deceased

in favor of: (1) the surviving spouse and child or children of the deceased, or either
such spouse or such child or children; (2) the surviving father and mother of the deceased, or either of them, if he left no spouse or child surviving; and (3) the surviving
brothers and sisters of the deceased, or any of them, if he left no spouse, child, or parent
surviving. The survivors in whose favor his right of action survives may also recover
the damages which they sustained through the wrongful death of the deceased. A right
to recover damages under the provisions of this paragraph is a property right which, on
the death of the survivor in whose favor the right of action survived, is inherited by his
legal, institute, or irregular heirs, whether suit has been instituted thereon by the survi-

vor or not.
La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2315 (West 1979).
(As used in this article, the words "child," "brother," "sister," "father," and "mother" include a
child, brother, sister, father, and mother, by adoption, respectively.)
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courts ruled that illegitimate children are not covered by the statute. 7
The Supreme Court, however, reversed. Justice Douglas, who delivered
the majority opinion, prefaced his arguments with his observation:
"[I]llegitimate children are not 'nonpersons.' They are humans, live, and
have their being. They are clearly 'persons' within the meaning of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Since illegitimate children are covered by the Equal Protection clause, Douglas set
out to determine whether the exclusion of illegitimate children under the
statute was invidious or rational. 9 He found that there exists no rational
basis for discrimination against illegitimate children: "Legitimacy or illegitimacy of birth has no relation to the nature of the wrong allegedly
inflicted on the mother. . . We conclude that it is invidious to discriminate against [illegitimate children] when no action, conduct, or demeanor of theirs is possibly relevant to the harm that was done to the
mother."10
Justice Harlan decried the Court's ruling. He believed that basing
recovery on a legally recognized relationship is just as "rational" as basing it on a biological relationship." Indeed, Justice Harlan considered
the legal distinction posited by the lower court to be valid and justified,
since it is in the interest of the state to promote legitimate family relationships and since the state is empowered to require formalities such as marriage or the acknowledgement of children born outside of marriage.
Under these circumstances, it seemed reasonable to Justice Harlan for a
7 Justice Douglas notes that "[t]he Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that 'child' in Article
2315 means 'legitimate child,' the denial to illegitimate children of 'the right of recovery' being
'based on moral and general welfare because it discourages bringing children into the world out of
wedlock.'" Levy, 391 U.S. at 70. See also Glona, 391 U.S. 73 (Harlan, J., dissenting) "Louisiana
has chosen . . . to define these classes of proper plaintiffs in terms of their legal rather than their
biological relations to the deceased." 391 U.S. at 79. "Children referred to in this law [the wrongful
death statute] include only those who are the issue of lawful wedlock or who, being illegitimate, have
been acknowledged or legitimated pursuant to methods expressly established by law." id. at 79 n.7
(quoting Thompson v. Vestal Lumber and Manufacturing Co., 16 So. 2d 594, 596 (La. Ct. App.
1943), rev'd on other grounds, 22 So. 2d 842 (1945)).
8 Levy, 391 U.S. at 70.
9 The Court begins its analysis by announcing: "Though the [equal protection] test has been
variously stated, the end result is whether the line drawn is a rational one. . . . In applying the
Equal Protection Clause to social and economic legislation, we give great latitude to the legislature
in making classifications." Id. at 71. The Court proceeds to raise the possibility that this case involves a fundamental right or suspect classification: "[We have been extremely sensitive when it
comes to basic civil rights. . and have not hesitated to strike down an invidious classification even
though it had history and tradition on its side. . . . The rights asserted here involve the intimate,
familial relationship between a child and his own mother. . . . id.
10 Id.

at 72.

1I "[T]he State must base its arbitrary definition of the plaintiff class on biological rather than
legal relationships. Exactly how this makes the Louisiana scheme even marginally more 'rational' is
not clear .......
Glona, 391 U.S. at 79 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (dissenting opinion to Glona applies
also to Levy 391 U.S. 68.).

ANTIOCH LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 3:59

state to demand adherence to these formalities in order for persons to
recover damages under this statute.
Justice Harlan maintained this same position in the Glona case, contrary to the majority of the Court. In this case, a mother was barred
from recovering damages for the wrongful death of her illegitimate son
under the Louisiana Wrongful Death Statute. Louisiana's courts interpreted the phrase "the surviving father and mother of the deceased, . . ." in the statute to mean that "a decedent must be legitimate
in order for an ascendent or sibling to recover for his death." 12 But this
interpretation was viewed as irrational by the Court. The majority was
unable to discern how precluding recovery for a wrongful death would
deter the "sin" of illegitimacy. Because the Supreme Court could find no
rational basis for the discrimination created by the state court's interpretation of the Wrongful Death Statute, it found that the mother was being
denied equal protection of the laws by the state of Louisiana.
Perhaps if the Court's composition had remained unchanged the
Court would have eventually declared illegitimacy a suspect classification, thus removing any remaining ambiguity from the status of illegitimate children. Such a declaration would have required future decisions
to be based on the strict scrutiny approach to state laws rather than the
looser "rational basis" standard. However, when the third case on illegitimacy was heard by the Court, Justices Warren and Clark had been
replaced by Justices Burger and Blackmun. These two new members
joined with the dissenters in the Levy and Glona cases to form a majority
13
in Labine v. Vincent.
Justice Black, writing for the majority, rejected the idea that "a
State can never treat an illegitimate child differently from legitimate offspring." 1 4 Thus the Court upheld Louisiana's intestate succession laws
whereby the collateral relations of the decedent can claim his or her
15
property to the exclusion of acknowledged, but illegitimate, children.
12Glona, 391 U.S. at 74 n.3.
13 Labine, 401 U.S. 532.
14 Id. at 536.

15 The Court never refers by name to the test that it uses, save for one statement wherein the
Court announces: "Even if we were to apply the 'rational basis' test to the Louisiana intestate succession statute, that statute clearly has a rational basis in view of Louisiana's interest in promoting
family life and of directing the disposition of property left within the state." Id. at 536 n.6. (emphasis added). This comment suggests that the court did not perceive itself as applying the rational
basis, even though the Court's reasons for upholding the statute includes deference to the State's
power "of regulating the manner and term upon which property real or personal within its dominion
may be transmitted by last will and testament, or by inheritance; and of prescribing who shall and
who shall not be capable of taking it." id at 539 n. 16 (quoting Mager v. Grima, 49 U.S. 490, 493 (8
How. 1890)).
The Court also takes into account the absence of an "insurmountable barrier to [the] illegitimate child." Labine, 401 U.S. at 539.
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Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Douglas, White, and Marshall in the
minority, implied that he perceived illegitimacy to be a suspect
classification. 16
The Labine decision marks the beginning of the Court's seemingly
inconsistent rulings on the status of illegitimacy under the equal protection clause. By departing from its decisions in Levy and Glona, without
offering appropriate guidelines for distinguishing the cases, the Court left
unresolved how subsequent cases should be judged. But the Court's ambiguous stance provided it with adequate space wherein the appropriate
position could evolve.
Two new justices, Powell and Rehnquist, first addressed the illegitimacy issue in Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety CO,,17 as the Court added a new dimension to its equal protection analysis. For the first time
the Court, with Justice Powell as its spokesman, attempted to balance the
respective interests of the state and the individuals affected by legislative
classifications. In Weber the classification involved children defined
under Louisiana laws governing Workmen's Compensation1 8 as "only legitimate children, stepchildren, posthumous children, adopted children
and illegitimate children acknowledged under the provisions of Civil
Code Articles 203, 204, and 205."' 19 Due to the inferior status accorded
unacknowledged illegitimate children, such children could not recover
benefits for the death of their natural father on an equal footing with
legitimate children.
Employing the logic of Levy, the Court struck down the challenged
law. It elaborated upon the method it uses when evaluating the soundness of a discriminatory law:
The tests to determine the validity of state statutes under the
Equal Protection Clause have been variously expressed, but this
Court requires, at a minimum, that a statutory classification bear
some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose ...
Though the latitude given state economic and social regulation is
necessarily broad, when state statutory classifications approach
16 Justice Brennan wrote:

In view of my conclusion that the present discrimination cannot stand even under the
"some rational basis" standard, I need not reach the questions whether illegitimacy is a
'suspect" classification that the state could not adopt in any circumstances without
showing a compelling state interest, or whether fundamental rights are involved, which
also would require a showing of a compelling state interest. . . . This Court has generally treated as suspect a classification that discriminates against an individual on the
basis of factors over which he has no control.
Labine, 401 U.S. at 551 n.19 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
17Weber, 406 U.S. 164 (Powell, J.) (Rhenquist, J., dissenting).
Is LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23:1021(3) (West 1964).

19Weber, 406 U.S. at 167 (footnote omitted).
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sensitive and fundamental personal rights, this Court exercises a
stricter scrutiny . . . ..The essential inquiry in all the foregoing
cases is, however, inevitably a dual one: What legitimate state interest does the classification promote? What fundamental per20
sonal rights might the classification endanger?
In addressing the first question, the Court examines the interests or
objectives proclaimed by the state-in this case, to promote legitimate
family relationships. When the Court is unable to find a rational relationship between the statute and the state interest, its inquiry ends without ascertaining whether or not a fundamental personal right is involved.
Thus the Weber Court, unable to discern a rational basis for the law,
never reached the second question. But the opinion intimated that the
Court was on the verge of enlarging the domain of suspect classifications
21
to include illegitimacy.
Justice Rehnquist stood diametrically opposed to the Court's interpretation of the 14th amendment. According to Rehnquist, the 14th
amendment's equal protection clause is applicable Only to cases which
address questions of racial classification. Moreover, Rehnquist pointed
out that this clause "requires neither that state enactments be 'logical'
nor . . . that they be 'just' in the common meaning of those terms. It
requires only that there be some conceivable set of facts that may justify
the classification involved."'22 For Rehnquist this condition was amply
satisfied by Louisiana's workmen's compensation statute. Therefore, he
maintained that if the Court was intent on applying the equal protection
clause to the Weber case it should at least adhere to the Dandridge v.
Williams 23 ruling where the Court clearly relied upon the rational basis
20
21

Id. at 172-73.
Justice Powell wrote:

The status of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages society's condemnation of
irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of marriage. But visiting this condemnation on
the head of an infant is illogical and unjust. (footnote omitted). Moreover, imposing
disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concepts of our system that
legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrong doing. Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the illegitimate child
is an ineffectual-as well as an unjust-way of deterring the parent. Courts are powerless to prevent the social opprobrium suffered by these hapless children, but the Equal
Protection Clause does enable us to strike down discriminatory laws relating to status
of birth where-as in this case-the classification is justified by no legitimate state interest, compelling or otherwise.
Id. at 175-76 & n.14 (citing Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Hunter v. Erikson, 393
U.S. 385 (1969); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Hirabayshi v. United States,
320 U.S. 81 (1943)). In light of the fact that Graham, Hunter, and Brown specifically focus on
suspect classifications, it is plausible that Powell intended for an inference to be drawn between these
classifications and illegitimacy.
22 Weber, 406 U.S. at 183 (Rhenquist, J., dissenting).
23 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
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test and affirmed that any classifications in the area of economics and
social welfare did not violate the Equal Protection Clause as long as the
classification has any reasonable justification. 24 Indeed, Rehnquist stated
that the Court could have followed the Labine decision and thereby upheld the challenged statute. But the Court was resolute in distinguishing
Weber from Labine, since Weber, unlike Labine, did not address the issue
of state interest in the stability of land titles and did not allow the decedent to acknowledge the illegitimate child.2 5 The Court was equally
forceful in establishing the similarities between Weber and Levy, insofar
as both cases involved "state-created compensation schemes, designed to
provide close relatives and dependents of a deceased a means of recovery
for his often abrupt and accidental death."'26 Thus, the two standards
pronounced by the Court in Levy and Labine continued to stand, with
only slight modification after Weber, since the two-pronged inquiry devised by Powell incorporated the essence of both standards.
The Court followed the Weber precedent and supported the rights of
illegitimate children in six subsequent cases. 27 However, in 1976, the
Court brushed aside almost all of its previous opinions 28 and rendered a
decision with the same effect as Labine-an apparent inconsistency. Mathews v. Lucas29 marks the second time the Court allowed a statute
which discriminates against illegitimate children to withstand an equal
protection challenge. With the exception of Labine, the Supreme Court
had been treating illegitimacy as a suspect classification, even though it
declined the opportunity to formally pronounce this stand.30
24 Weber, 406 U.S. at 181-82 (quoting Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 485).
25 Weber, 406 U.S. at 170.
26 Id. at 171.
27 Beaty, 418 U.S. 901; Jimenez, 417 U.S. 628; New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization, 411

U.S. 619; Gomez, 409 U.S. 535; Griffen, 409 U.S. 1069; Davis, 409 U.S. 1069.
28 Jimenez, 417 U.S. 628; New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization, 411 U.S. 619; Gomez, 409
U.S. 535; Griffen, 409 U.S. 1069; Davis, 409 U.S. 1069; Weber, 406 U.S. 164; Levy, 391 U.S. 68.
The court argues that the contested statute in Matthews, unlike the statue in these cases, is "carefully tuned to alternative considerations." Mathews, 427 U.S. at 513.
29 Mathews, 427 U.S. 495.

30Chief Justice Burger speaks for the majority in Jirninez, 417 U.S. 628 when he says:
Appellants urge that the contested Social Security provisions are based upon the so-

called 'suspect classification' of illegitimacy. Like race and national origin, they argue,
illegitimacy is a characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth; it is a condi-

tion beyond the control of the children, and it is a status that subjects the children to a
stigma of inferiority and a badge of opprobrium. We need not reach appellants' argument, however, because in the context of this case it is enough that we note as we did in
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972):
"The status of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages society's condemnation
of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bounds of marriage. But visiting this condemnation
on the head of an infant is illogical and unjust. Moreover, imposing disabilities on the
illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal burden should

bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously, no child
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The statute in question provided Social Security benefits to children
of a deceased parent, but required illegitimate children to prove the parent had been supporting them at the time of death. The Court, through
Justice Blackmun, upheld the statute, downplaying the history of discrimination against illegitimate children. "[D]iscrimination against illegitimates has never approached the severity and pervasiveness of the
historic legal and political discrimination against women and Negroes."131 Since illegitimacy, unlike race and sex, is not visually obvious,
the Court was unwilling to apply the same level of scrutiny to discrimination against illegitimates as it applies to sexual and racial discrimination.
However the Court did demand that any distinctions made between legitimate and illegitimate children must be rationally justified.
In Mathews the justification offered by the government was quite
simple: it is highly probable that legitimate children and illegitimate
children who satisfy the eligibility criteria dictated by 42 U.S.C.
§§ 416(h)(2)(A) or (B) or §§ 416(h)(3)(C)(i) or (ii) have most likely not
been financially supported by the insured wage earner and therefore the
financial support these children receive is unchanged when the wage
earner dies. Based on the probability, agreed to by a three-judge court in
Norton v. Weinberger the government maintained that it is both rational
and reasonable, in terms of administrative convenience, for the government to presume dependency for some children (legitimate and illegitimate children covered by the statute) while denying that presumption to
other children (illegitimate ones not covered by the statute). The government grounded its argument in the legislative history of 42 U.S.C.
is responsible for his birth and penalizing the illegitimate child is an ineffectual-as well
as unjust-way of deterring the parent. Courts are powerless to prevent the social
opprobrium suffered by these hapless children, but the Equal Protection Clause does
enable us to strike down discriminatory laws relating to status of birth where. . . the
classification is justified by no legitimate state interest, compelling or otherwise."
Jiminez, 417 U.S. at 631 (citation omitted). See also Trimble, 430 U.S. 762 (Rehnquist, J.):
[I]llegitimacy. . . has never been held by the Court to be a "suspect classification."
Nevertheless, in several opinions of the Court, statements can be found which suggest
that although illegitimates are not members of a "suspect class," laws which treat them
differently from those born in wedlock will receive a more far-reaching scrutiny under
the Equal Protection Clause than will other laws regulating economic and social
conditions.
430 U.S. at 781.
31 Mathews, 427 U.S. at 505-6.
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§ 402(d)(1): 32
[T]he statute was not a general welfare provision for legitimate or
otherwise "approved" children of deceased insureds, but was intended just "to replace the support lost by a child when his father
."33
. . . dies.
Deferring to Congress, 34 the Court concluded that the statute does
not "impermissibly discriminate" against illegitimate children to whom
the presumption of dependency is not extended, and that the challenged
classifications are justified as reasonable legislative judgments designed to
link entitlement of survivor's benefits to dependency at the time of the
parent's death.
Justice Stevens began his Supreme Court career by having Justices
Brennan and Marshall join him in a dissenting opinion. 3" He believed
that the Court's conclusion did not follow from its original premises.
Although the Court acknowledged that, legally, illegitimacy is like race
and national origin, and that imposing disabilities on illegitimate children is "illogical and unjust," the Court permitted illegitimate children
to be discriminated against in the interest of administrative convenience.
32Norton v. Weinberger, 364 F. Supp. 1117 (D. Md. 1973). This section defines who may apply
for and be entitled to survivor's benefits:
Section 202(1) of the Act, as set forth in 42 U.S.C. 402(d)(1), provides in pertinent part:
Every child (as defined in section 416(e) of this title). . . of an individual who dies a fully or
currently insured individual, if such a child
(A) has filed application for child's insurance benefits,
(B) at the time such application was filed was unmarried and (i) either had not attained the
age of 18 or was a full-time student and had not attained the age of 22 . . . and
(C) was dependent upon such individual:
(ii) if such individual has died, at the time of such death, .... shall be entitled to a child's
insurance benefit for each month, beginning with the first month after August 1950 in which such
"
child becomes so entitled to such insurance benefits ..
Section 212(e), 42 U.S.C. § 416(e), includes, under the definition of child, inter alia, 'the child
. . . of an individual,' certain legally adopted children, certain stepchildren, and certain grandchildren and stepgrandchildren. . . . Id. at 498 n.I.
33 Mathews, 427 U.S. at 507 (citation omitted from quote).
3 Justice Blackmun states that:
[T]he constitutional question is not whether such a presumption is required, but
whether it is permitted. Nor, in ratifying these statutory classifications, is our role to
hypothesize independently on the desirability or feasibility of any possible alternative
basis for presumption. These matters of practical judgment and empirical calculations
are for Congress. . . Our role is simply to determine whether Congress' assumptions
are so inconsistently or insubstantial as not to be reasonably supportive of its conclusions that individualized factual inquiry in order to isolate each nondependent child in
a given class of cases is unwarranted as an administrative exercise. In the end, the
precise accuracy of Congress' calculations is not a matter of specialized judicial competence; and we have no basis to question them beyond the evident consistency and
substantiality.
Id. at 515-6.
35 Id. at 517-8.

68
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This was unpalatable to Justice Stevens. He contended that since illegitimate children are traditionally disfavored by society and subjected to invidious stereotypes, the Court should be sensitive to their plight and not
accept "administrative convenience" as a valid primary justification for
such discrimination.
The Court supported its conclusion by noting that "such presumptions in aid of administrative functions . . . are permissible . . . so long
as that lack of precise equivalence does not exceed the bounds of substantiality tolerated by the applicable level of scrutiny. ' 36 But to the consternation of Justice Stevens, the Court never explicitly identified the
"applicable level of scrutiny." While the Court rejected the standard of
strict scrutiny, 37 it did not revert to the minimal scrutiny of the rational
basis test. In Mathews, the Court seemed to be searching for a compromise between these two extreme standards-one which was neither extremely strict nor entirely "toothless." This new standard-intermediate
scrutiny-was clarified by the Court in Trimble v. Gordon.38 It looked
39
suspiciously like the dual inquiry approach established in Weber.
Justice Powell, writing for the Court, began the analysis of Trimble
by identifying the principal equal protection standards the Court has employed in past cases: the minimum rationality standard which "requires
at a minimum that a statutory classification bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose;" 4 the stricter scrutiny standard which
applies when the "statutory classification approaches sensitive and fun36 Id. at 509.
37 This is evidenced by the Court's statement that: "[Tihe Act's discrimination between individuals on the basis of their legitimacy does not 'command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process,' [which]. . . our most exacting scrutiny would entail." Id. at 506
(quoting San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)). Further elabo-

ration on this point comes when the Court explains that:
In cases of strictest scrutiny, such approximations must be supported at least by a

showing that the Government's dollar "lost" to overincluded benefit recipients is returned by a dollar "saved" in administrative expense avoided... Under the standard
of review appropriate here, however,. . .Congress is [not] required in this realm of less
than strictest scrutiny to weigh the burdens of administrative inquiry solely in terms of
dollars ultimately "spent," ignoring the relative amounts devoted to administrative

rather than welfare uses .... "
Mathews, 427 U.S. at 509-10 (emphasis added).
38 Trimble, 430 U.S. 762.
39 Comparing the intermediate standard with the stricter scrutiny standard as characterized by
the dual questions posed in Weber, 406 U.S. at 107 (See supra note 24 and accompanying text.), it

seems plain that the difference between these two approaches is one of degree. Both standards focus
on a means-end inquiry, i.e., they both ask does the classification in question achieve the government's purported interest. However, the intermediate standard seems to go a step further by investi-

gating the means imposed by the statutory scheme. Hence, the government must convince the Court
not only of the fact that the means employed are necessary, but also that the desired end cannot be
realized by any other means.
40 Weber, 406 U.S. at 172.
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damental personal rights; ' 41 and the "most exacting" or strict scrutiny
standard which is used whenever a "suspect class is involved."' 42 He then
pronounced that the appropriate level of scrutiny in Trimble is intermediate scrutiny, where the Court balances the interests of the state against
the interests of the individuals affected by the classification. 4 3 Using this
measure, the Court examined the relationship between the classification
stemming from § 12 of the Illinois Probate Code" and the state's twin
interests-promoting legitimate family relationships and establishing an
accurate method for the disposition of property at death. It found that
the Illinois statute violates the equal protection clause of the 14th
amendment.
In reaching this decision, Justice Powell rejected, without overruling, the reasoning of Labine because it "is difficult to place in the pattern
of this Court's equal protection decisions and subsequent cases have limited its force as a precedent." '4 5 In lieu of Labine the Court relied upon
Weber and Mathews. The Court reiterated its holding in Weber that it is
unreasonable, unjust, and ineffectual for the state to punish illegitimate
children in an effort to influence parental conduct. Since § 12 bears only
"the most attenuated relationship to the asserted goal" 46-to

promote

legitimate family relationships-the state's first argument was quickly
dismissed by the Court on the ground that § 12 fails to advance the
state's interests.
The state's second argument, although more substantial, was also
41 Id.

42 Mathews, 427 U.S. at 506.
43 This is exemplified by the Court's remark that "the judicial task here is the difficult one of
vindicating constitutional rights without interfering unduly with the State's primary responsibility in
this area." Trimble, 430 U.S. at 771.
Section 12 of the Illinois Probate Act provides that:
An illegitimate child is heir of his mother and of any material ancestor, and of any

person from whom his mother might have inherited, if living; and the lawful issue of an
illegitimate person shall represent such person and take, by descent, any estate which
the parent would have taken, if living. A child who was illegitimate whose parents
intermarry and who is acknowledged by the father as the father's child is legitimate.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 12 (1973) as cited in Trimble, 430 U.S. at 764-5. In effect, this statute
allows an illegitimate child to inherit through intestate succession from the mother only, while a

legitimate child is allowed to inherit through intestate succession from both the mother and the
father.
45 Trimble, 430 U.S. at 762 n.12. The Court continues:

In Weber. . . .we found in Labine a recognition that judicial deference is appropriate
when the challenged statute involves the "substantial state interest in providing for the
stability of. . . land titles and in the prompt and definitive determination of the valid
ownership of property left by decedents..." We affirm that view, but there is a point

beyond which such deference cannot justify discrimination.
Id. (citation omitted from quote).
46 Id. at 768.
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dismantled by the Court. The Court conceded that the state has a legitimate interest in establishing an accurate method of property disposition
and in protecting estates against spurious claims. However, it said that
§ 12 exceeds its intended purpose by totally barring illegitimate children
from ever inheriting their deceased father's intestate estate, even in those
instances where paternity is certain, unless the father marries the mother
and acknowledges the children. Because § 12 does not conform to the
Mathews requirement-that "the statute does not broadly discriminate
between legitimates and illegitimates without more, but is carefully tuned
to alternative considerations" 47-the Court found the statute to be constitutionally flawed.
In reaching its conclusion, the Court reaffirmed the Mathews rejection of illegitimacy as a suspect classification. The Court then defined the
applicable standard of review-less than "strict scrutiny" but more than
"rational basis." This intermediate standard encompasses the dual inquiry approach of Weber and in effect balances state interests against
individual interests. As a result, the Court examined the Illinois Statute
more critically than the Louisiana standard in Labine and dictated that
the more recent analysis (Trimble) will be controlling in the future. The
Court attempted to distinguish Labine from Trimble:
[P]enalizing children as a means of influencing their parents seems
inconsistent with the desire of the Illinois Legislature to make the
intestate succession law more just to illegitimate children. Moreover, the difference in the rights of illegitimate children in the estates of their mothers and their fathers appears to be unrelated to
the purpose of promoting family relationships. In this respect the
Louisiana laws at issue in Labine were quite different, the child's
illegitimacy. 'Bastard children' were given no inheritance rights.
'Natural children,' who could be and were acknowledged under
state law, were given limited inheritance rights, but still less than
those of legitimate children. 400 U.S., at 537, and n. 13. The
Louisiana categories are consistent with a theory of social opprobrium regarding the parents' relationships and with a measured, if
48
misguided, attempt to deter illegitimate relationships.
The dissenters, Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Blackmun
47 Id at 772 (citing Mathews, 427 U.S. at 513). Indeed, the Court maintains that section 12 is
unable to withstand judicial scrutiny given the fact that:
[The Illinois Supreme Court] failed to consider the possibility of a middle ground between the extremes of complete exclusion and case by case determination of paternity.
For at least some significant categories of illegitimate children of intestate men, inheritance rights can be recognized without jeopardizing the orderly settlement of estates or
the dependability of titles to property passing under intestacy laws.
Trimble, 430 U.S. at 771.
48 Trimble, 430 U.S. at 768-9 n. 13.
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and Rehnquist, were unable to distinguish between Labine and Trimble.
Justice Rehnquist added a separate dissent wherein he outlined the original intent of the 14th amendment (to bar racial discrimination) and criticized the Court's adjudication of equal protection claims. He said it is
the Court's habit to expand the meaning of the 14th amendment beyond
classifications based on race or national origin, and that this habit causes
confusion regarding the proper level of scrutiny to be applied in nonracial cases. "The appropriate 'scrutiny,' in the eyes of the Court, appears [to Justice Rehnquist] to involve some analysis of the relation of
the 'purpose' of the legislature to the 'means' by which it chooses to carry
out the purpose."' 49 Hence, the Court is constantly required to secondguess the legislature's judgment and decide "how much 'imperfection'
between means and ends is permissible" 5 0 -a function which Justice
Rehnquist asserts is outside the commission and qualifications of the
Court. In order for the Court to remain within its proper domain, Justice Rehnquist prescribes a return to the rational basis test in all equal
protection cases, excluding race and national origin classifications. Using
this standard Justice Rehnquist would sustain the constitutionality of
§ 12, for he finds the distinctions made between legitimate and illegiti51
mate children to be neither "mindless" nor "patently irrational.
In Quilloin v. Walcott,52 the Court rendered its first (and only) unanimous illegitimacy decision. In this case, an illegitimate father sought to
block adoption of his child by the mother's new husband. The applicable
state law required the permission of both biological parents for a legitimate child to be adopted, but only the mother's permission for an illegitimate child. The Court ruled that while the parent-child relationship is
constitutionally protected, the state may under some circumstances apply a "best interests of the child" standard 53 without violating the equal
protection clause-as in the case of the unwed father who has "never
been a de facto member of the child's family unit" 54 and55who has "never
exercised either actual or legal custody over his child."
Although the Court neglected to specify the appropriate standard of
review applicable in this case, it seemed to be using intermediate scrutiny 56 to determine the constitutionality of §§ 74-203 and 74-403(3) of
49 Id. at 781.
50 Id. at 784.
51 Id. at 786.

Quiloin, 434 U.S. 246.
Id. at 254.
54 Id. at 253.
55 Id. at 256.
56 Although an argument can be made that the Court used the rational basis test, it seems more
probable thatthe intermediate scrutiny standard is employed in this case given the composition of
the Court and the Court's previous rulings. However, perhaps the ruling is unanimous because
52

53
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the Georgia Code. 57 The Court balanced the unwed "father's interest in
the 'companionship, care, custody, and management' of his children" 58s
against the state's interest that "caring for the children is 'de minimis' if
the father is in fact a fit parent."'59 Given the specific circumstances in
Quilloin-that over an eleven year period the natural father supported
his child only irregularly, that he never attempted to legitimate or gain
custody of his child, that he paid visits to his child which were viewed as
disruptive and unhealthy to the child by the child's mother, and that the
child, himself, stated his desire to be adopted and to change his last
name-the Court viewed the state's claim as more substantial than the
unwed father's. Since the state intended to grant recognition to an aleither standard would produce the same result and the Court is more concerned with the result than
the method.
57 In order to gain the full import of §§ 74-203 and 74-403(3) it is necessary to include §§ 74103, 74-403(1), and 74-403(2). These sections of the Georgia Code are as follows:
Section 74-403(1) sets forth the general rule that "no adoption shall be permitted except
with the written consent of the living parents of a child." Section 74-403(2) provides
that consent is not required from a parent who (1) has surrendered rights in the child to
a child-placing agency or to the adoption court; (2) is found by the adoption court to
have abandoned the child, or to have willfully failed for a year or longer to comply with
a court-imposed support order with respect to the child; (3) has had his or her parental
right terminated by court order, see Ga. Code § 24A-3201; (4) is insane or otherwise
incapacitated from giving consent; or (5) cannot be found after a diligent search has
been made.
Section 74-403(3), which operates as an exception to the rule stated in § 74-403(1)
provides:
Illegitimate children.-If the child be illegitimate, the consent of the mother alone shall
suffice. Such consent, however, shall not be required if the mother has surrendered all
of her rights to said child to a licensed child-placing agency, or to the State Department
of Family and Children Services.
Sections of Ga. Code (1975) will hereinafter be referred to merely by their numbers.
Section 74-103 provides in full:
A father of an illegitimate child may render the same legitimate by petitioning the
superior court of the county of his residence, setting forth the name, age and sex of such
child, and also the name of the mother; and if he desires the name changed, stating the
new name, and praying the legitimation of such child. Of this application the mother,
if alive, shall have notice. Upon such application, presented and filed, the court may
pass an order declaring said child to be legitimate, and capable of inheriting from the
father in the same manner as if born in lawful wedlock, and the name by which he or
she shall be known.
Section 74-203 states:
The mother of an illegitimate child shall be entitled to the possession of the child,
unless the father shall legitimate him as before provided. Being the only recognized
parent, she may exercise all the paternal power.
Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 248-9 n.2-5. In its opinion in this case, the Georgia Supreme Court indicated
that the word "paternal" in the second sentence of this provision is the result of a misprint and was
instead intended to read "parental." See id. at 249 n.5. (Ga. Code § 74-403 (1933) has been recodifled since the decision in Quilloin and replaced by Ga. Code § 19-8-3 (1982).-Editor).
58 Quillion, 434 U.S. at 248 (quoting Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651.).
59 Id. (quoting Stanley, 405 U.S. at 657.).
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ready existing family unit which was opposed only by the natural father,
who neither had nor wanted custody or actual responsibility for his child,
the Court maintained as follows:
Whatever may be required in other situations, we cannot say that
the State was required in this situation to find anything more than
that the adoption, and denial of legitimation, were in the 'best interests of the child. . . .' [For] under any standard of review, the
State was not foreclosed from recognizing [the] difference in the
extent of commitment to the welfare of the child [assumed by the
unwed father in this case that usually is borne by a separated or
divorced father.]6°
For these reasons the Court affirmed with a single voice the constitutionality of §§ 74-203 and 74-403(3) as they apply to Quilloin.
The unified voice of the Court broke in Lalli v. Lalli.61 Justice Powell, writing for a plurality of the court, was able to convince only two
62
other Justices (Burger and Stewart) to uphold a New York statute, which allows an illegitimate child to inherit from an intestate father only
if, during the father's lifetime, a judicial declaration of paternity is obtained-by distinguishing Trimble.63 Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist
joined these three Justices to form a majority and uphold this statute, but
60 Id. at 255, 6.
61 Lalli, 439 U.S. 259.
62 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUsTs Law § 4-1.2 (McKinney 1967). This section provides:
"(a) For the purpose of this article:
"(1) An illegitimate child is the legitimate child of his mother so that he and his
issue inherit from his mother and from his maternal kindred.
"(2) An illegitimate child is the legitimate child of his father so that he and his
issue inherit from his father if a court of competent jurisdiction has, during the lifetime
of the father, made an order of filiation declaring paternity in a proceeding instituted
during the pregnancy of the mother or within two years from the birth of the child.
"(3) The existence of an agreement obligating the father to support the illegitimate child does not qualify such child or his issue to inherit from the father in the
absence of an order of filiation made as prescribed by subparagraph (2).
"(4) A motion for relief from an order of filiation may be only by the father, and
such motion must be made within one year from the entry of such order.
(b) If an illegitimate child dies, his surviving spouse, issue, mother, maternal kindred and father inherit and are entitled to letters of administration as if the decedent
were legitimate, provided that the father may inherit or obtain such letters only if an
order of filiation has been made in accordance with the provisions of subparagraph (2).
Lalli, 439 U.S. at 261-2 n.2.
63 Trimble is distinguished from Lalli on two grounds: In Trimble the Illinois statute required
both the father's acknowledgement of paternity and the intermarriage of the parents in order to
permit inheritance by the child, whereas in Lalli the New York statute only required that the father's
paternity be judicially declared prior to his death. The second difference between Trimble and Lalli
is that the Illinois statute possessed a dual purpose-to encourage legitimate family relationships and
to insure the orderly distribution of intestate estate; while the New York statute sought only to
insure an orderly disposition of property at death. See 439 U.S. at 266-8.
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they argued that Trimble should be overruled. The dissenters (Justices
Brennan, White, Marshall, and Stevens) disagreed with both the Court's
conclusion and its rationale, and voted to invalidate the statute on the
strength of Trimble, since they saw no significant difference between
Trimble and Lalli.
In essence, the Court seems to have withdrawn from the intermediate standard utilized in Trimble and to have returned to the rational basis
test in considering the constitutionality of § 4-1.2. Justice Powell initially used the balancing approach established in Trimble-i.e., weighing
the relationship between the state's interest and the means adopted to
achieve its interests. He asserted that "the primary goal underlying the
challenged aspects of § 4-1.2 is to provide for the just and orderly disposition of property at death."' 64 By requiring an order of filiation declaring
paternity to be issued during the father's lifetime, the state sought to
avoid fraudulent claims and to alleviate administrative problems associated with notification of illegitimate children whose existence is
unknown.
Justice Powell's departure from Trimble occurred when, having established that § 4-1.2 is related to the state's interest, he had to determine
whether "the state statute [was] carefully tailored to eliminate imprecise
and unduly burdensome methods for establishing paternity. '65 Since the
statute bars all "known" illegitimates who can convincingly substantiate
their paternity even though they lack the official order of filiation and
who therefore would not be disruptive to the orderly disposition of their
fathers' estates, § 4-1.2 lacks precision and is unfair insofar as this statute
extends beyond the state's asserted purpose. If Justice Powell had continued to use Trimble as precedent he could not have upheld the constitutionality of § 4-1.2. Hence he resorts to the rational basis test:
[O]ur inquiry under the Equal Protection Clause does not focus on
the abstract 'fairness' of a state law, but on whether the statute's
relation to the state interests it is intended to promote is so tenuous that it lacks the rationality contemplated by the Fourteenth
Amendment.

66

Thus, in refuting the arguments put forth in Justice Brennan's dissenting
opinion, Justice Powell analyzes the statute in terms of whether it has a
"rational basis.":
[E]ven if, as Justice Brennan believes, § 4-1.2 could have been
written somewhat more equitably, it is not the function of a court
'to hypothesize independently on the desirability of feasibility of
6

Id. at 268.

65

Trimble, 430 U.S. at 772 n.14 (quoted in part in Lalli, 439 U.S. at 275 n.l1.).

66 Lalli, 439 U.S. at 273.
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any possible alternative[s]' to the statutory scheme formulated by
New York. 'These matters of practical judgment and empirical
calculation are for the [State] . . . . In the end, the precise accuracy of [the State's] calculations is not a matter of specialized judicial competence; and we have no basis to question their detail
67
beyond the evident consistency and substantiality.'
With these words the Court signaled a step backwards to the deferential attitude towards the legislature exhibited in Labine. The approval
of both Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist can be gleaned from their respective concurring opinions. Justice Blackmun was gratified that the
Court reverted to the Labine principles. His main point of disagreement
with the Court was its reluctance to overrule Trimble, since "the corresponding statutes of other States will be of questionable validity (if Trimble is not derelict) until this Court passes on them, one by one, as being
68
on the Trimble side of the line or the Labine-Lalli side."
Justice Rehnquist would also adopt the Labine rationale. His dissent in Trimble served as his concurrence in Lalli, where he advocated a
return to the rational basis test and where he criticized the Trimble
Court for balancing means against ends-a censure which could also be
levied against the Lalli Court.
The dissenters could not accept the application of Labine to the
Lalli case. In their opinion, the governing precedents were Mathews and
Trimble. Justice Brennan succinctly stated the main argument of the
dissenting Justices: (1) fathers who acknowledge or voluntarily support
their illegitimate children are unlikely to have paternity suis filed against
them. Consequently, since illegitimate children in this category will virtually never possess a judicial filation order declaring paternity, they will
always be excluded from inheriting their intestate father's estate under
the New York statute; (2) acknowledged illegitimate children are unnecessarily prohibited from claiming their father's intestate estate even
though they could prove their paternity without compromising the
state's interests. Because the state could devise "less drastic means" for
preventing spurious paternity claims and for solving the problem of notifying unknown illegitimate children, Justice Brennan concluded that § 41.2 "discriminates against illegitimates through means not substantially
related to the legitimate interests that the statute purports to promote. '69
To be affirmed by the dissenters, the statute would have to establish a
closer relationship between the state's interests and the burden carried by
67 Id. at 274 (citations omitted from quote).
68 Id. at 277.
69 Id. at 279.
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those individuals affected by the statute-i.e., it would have to satisfy the
level of scrutiny applied in Mathews and Trimble rather than Labine.
The Court, through Justice Powell, measured the challenged statute
in Caban v. Mohammed70 against the principles voiced in Trimble-evaluation of the state's interests versus the classified individual's interests,
analysis of the relationship between the state's interests and the statutory
means of achieving its interest, investigation of carefully tuned alternatives, and application of a standard which is "not toothless."
The challenged statute, § 111 of the New York Domestic Relations
Law provides that:
[S]ubject to the limitations hereinafter set forth, consent to adoption shall be required as follows: . . .(2) Of the parents or surviv-

ing parent, whether adult or infant, of a child born in wedlock;
(3) Of the mother, whether adult or infant, of a child born out of
wedlock .... 71
If parental consent is not denied a parent under § 111 (11) then, by withholding consent, only an unwed mother can block her child's adoption
per § 111 (I)(3). The effect of this statute is that an unwed father cannot
adopt his children without the consent of their mother, but an unwed
70

Caban, 441 U.S. 380.

71 At the time of the proceedings before the Surrogate, § 111, as amended by 1975 N.Y.

Laws, chs. 246 and 704, provided:
Subject to the limitations hereinafter set forth consent to adoption shall be required as
follows:
". Of the adoptive child, if over fourteen years of age, unless the judge or surrogate
in his discretion dispenses with such consent;
"2. Of the mother, whether adult or infant, of a child born out of wedlock;
"4. Of any person or authorized agency having lawful custody of the adoptive child.
"The consent shall not be required of a parent who has abandoned child or who
has surrendered the child to an authorized agency for the purpose of adoption under
the provisions of the social services law or of a parent for whose child a guardian has
been appointed under the provisions of section three hundred eighty-four of the social
services law or who has been deprived of civil rights or who is insane or who has been
judicially declared incompetent or who is mentally retarded as defined by the mental
hygiene law or who has been adjudged to be an habitual drunkard or who has been
judicially deprived of the custody of the child on account of cruelty or neglect, or pursuant to a judicial finding that the child is a permanently neglected child as defined in
section six hundred eleven of the family court act of the state of New York; except that
notice of proposed adoption shall be given in such manner as the judge or surrogate
may direct and an opportunity to be heard thereon may be afforded to a parent who has
been deprived of civil rights and to a parent if the judge or surrogate so orders.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, neither the notice of a proposed adoption
nor any process in such proceeding shall be required to contain the name of the person
or persons seeking to adopt the child. For the purpose of this section, evidence of
insubstantial and infrequent contacts by a parent with his or her child shall not, of
itself, be sufficient as a matter of law to preclude a finding that such parent has abandoned such a child."
Caban, 441 U.S. at 385-386 n.4.
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mother can adopt her children without their father's consent. To prevent
an unwed mother from adopting his children, an unwed fahter must
demonstrate that such action is contrary to the child's best interests.
Since § 111(1)(3) unquestionably treats unmarried parents differently, Justice Powell employed the gender-discrimination test of Craig v.
Boren 72 : the distinctions, in order to withstand judicial scrutiny under
the Equal Protection clause, "must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives."' 73 This test is a form of the intermediate scrutiny standard found
74
in Trimble.
The state characterized its interests as recognizing the fundamental
differences between maternal and paternal relations and promoting the
adoption of illegitimate children. Both of these interests were important
in the eyes of the Court, within limits. With respect to the state's first
objective, the Court noted that as children develop, the generalization
that unwed mothers are closer to their children than unwed fathers becomes too broad. If the natural father accepts responsibility for his children, or if he has been at some point part of the family unit, then the
relationship between an unwed father and his children may rival that
which exists between an unwed mother and her children as the children
grow older. In response to the state's second objective, i.e., promoting
adoption, the Court quoted Reed v. Reed,75 wherein it ruled that a statutory classification "must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon
some ground of differences having a fair and substantial relation to the
object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall
be treated alike." '76 Justice Powell pointed out that § 111 fails to meet
this requirement, for the state's interest in promoting adoption could be
advanced through alternative methods more attuned to its interests.
The Court considered the classification in § 11 l(l)(3), which
presumes "unwed fathers [to be] invariably less qualified and less entitled
than mothers to exercise a concerned judgment as to the fate of their
children,"' 77 to be an overbroad generalization which violates the 14th
amendment, since it prevents some "loving fathers" from participating in
the adoption decision, and enables some "alienated mothers" to sever a
father's paternal rights.
Justice Stewart dissented:
72 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
73 Caban, 441 U.S. at 388 (quoting Craig, 429 U.S. at 197).
74 See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
75 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
76 Caban, 441 U.S. at 391 (quoting Reed, 404 U.S. at 76).
77 Id. at 394.
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Parental rights do not spring full-blown from the biological connection between parent and child. They require relationships
more enduring. The mother carries and bears the child, and in
this sense her parental relationship is clear. The validity of the
father's parental claims must be guaged by other measures. By
tradition, the primary measure has been the legitimate familial re78
lationship he creates with the child by marriage with the mother.
Without marriage, Justice Stewart deems an unwed father's actual relationship to his child, regardless of how substantial that relationship may
be, as insufficient to outweigh § I I 1(I)(3), since a father's rights are traditionally created by marriage. Moreover, Justice Stewart argued that unwed parents are not always similarly situated-for example, where
newborn children and infants are to be adopted and the father is "unknown, unavailable, or simply uninterested."' 79 Therefore a gender-based
distinction such as the one contained in § I I 1(I)(3) does not violate the
Equal Protection Clause.
In those instances when the unwed father establishes a paternity relationship with his children and is thus similarly situated with the
mother, Justice Stewart agrees with the dissenting arguments of Justice
Stevens. Stevens was joined by Justices Burger and Rehnquist in saying
that equal protection is not denied to unwed fathers by § I I l(I)(3). At
the center of Justice Stevens' reasoning were the best interests of the children and the facilitation of their adoption. He stressed that granting an
unwed father the right to veto an adoption would not only frustrate the
state's interest but would also "provide a very fertile field for
80
extortion."
The number of cases wherein the unwed parents are similarly situated is so small as to be an insignificant exception to the gender-based
distinction codified in § I1 (I)(3), according to Justice Stevens. For this
reason he maintained that there does not exist a sufficient reason for invalidating this statute and subverting the interests of the state.
Although the dissenters never referred to the equal protection standard they were using, it seems plausible, given the precedents they cite,
that they were applying intermediate scrutiny. In the balance of interests
78 Id. at 397.

79 441 U.S. at 399. Justice Stewart points out that:
[O1nly the mother carries and gives birth to the child. . . [only] the unwed mother is
always an identifiable parent and the custodian of the child-until or unless the State
intervenes. The biological father, unless he has established a familial tie with the child
by marrying the mother, is often a total stranger from the State's point of view ...
[For he has] failed to come forward [and] has established no relationship with the child.
Id.
o Id. at 411 n.20.
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between the state (and by extension the unwed mother and the illegitimate children) and he unwed father, the dissenters perceived the state's
interests to be more substantial and § 111 (1)(3) as furthering those interests without being "unduly burdensome."
The Court again demonstrated its seeming ambivalence regarding
the appropriate level of scrutiny in Parham v. Hughes."' On the same
day the Court rendered the Caban decision, the Caban dissenters, with
the assistance of Justice Powell's swing vote, formed a plurality in
Parham. As a result, the Court seems to have once again moved away
from the intermediate scrutiny of Trimble, returned to the rational basis
82
test, and deferred to the legislature.
Justice Stewart, on behalf of the Court, conferred upon state laws "a
presumption of validity against attack under the Equal Protection
Clause, [since] legislatures have wide discretion in passing laws that have
the inevitable effect of treating some people differently from others, and
legislative classifications are valid unless they bear no rational relationship to a permissible state objective."' 83 Consequently, unless the Court
finds that the discriminatory treatment in § 105-1307 of the Georgia
Code,8 4 which allows mothers, but not fathers, of illegitimate children to
recover for their child's wrongful death (if there is no mother to recover
for their child's wrongful death (if there is no mother, a father who has
legitimated his children can sue), bears no conceivable relationship to
any legislative purpose, the statute will be upheld.
The state professed three interests which it alleged this statute advances: (1) avoiding problems of proving paternity in wrongful death
actions; (2) promoting a legitimate family unit; and (3) setting a standard
of morality.
The Court immediately stated that the level of scrutiny found in
81Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979).
82 The Court's deference is illustrated by its own statement:

In the absence of invidious discrimination, however, a court is not free under the aegis
of the Equal Protection Clause to substitute its judgment for the will of the people of a
State as expressed in the laws passed by their popularly elected legislatures. "The Constitution presumes that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the domestic process, and that judicial intrevention
is generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may think a political branch has
acted."
Parham, 441 U.S. at 351 (quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979)).
83 441 U.S. at 350.
84 Section 105-1307 provides:
A mother, or, if no mother, a father, may recover for the homicide of a child, minor or
sui juris, unless said child shall leave a wife, husband or child. The mother or father
shall be entitled to recover the full value of the life of such child. In suit by the mother
the illegitimacy of the child shall be no bar to a recovery.
441 U.S. at 348 n.1.
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Weber and Trimble is not applicable to § 105-1307 since it does not discriminate between classes of illegitimate children:
The statute does not impose differing burdens or award differing
benefits to legitimate and illegitimate children. It simply denies a
natural father the right to sue for his illegitimate child's wrongful
death . . . . [Hence] the justifications for judicial sensitivity to
the constitutionality of differing legislative treatment of legitimate
and illegitimate children are simply absent when a classification
affects only the fathers of the deceased illegitimate children. 85
What is not absent in this statute is a sex-based distinction between
mothers and fathers of illegitimate children. But the Court observes that
the distinction drawn between unwed parents under § 105-1307 does not
invidiously discriminate against the father. This observation is grounded
on § 74-103 of the Georgia Code8 6 which mandates that only the father
can unilaterally petition the court to legitimate his illegitimate children.
In this respect unwed parents are not similarly situated for, while a father
can act to change his children's status from illegitimate to legitimate, a
mother cannot. Another difference between the unwed parents is one of
identity-while the mother's identity is rarely in doubt, the father's is
87
frequently unknown.
In order for an unwed father to make his identity known, he merely
needs to file a motion under § 74-103. If he does this, then he is eligible
to sue for the wrongful death of his children in the same manner as fathers of legitimate children. Since Georgia law grants an unwed father
the opportunity, prior to the death of his children, to officially identify
himself and thereby change not only the status of his children but also
his own status, to the extent that he would be accorded the same rights as
a father whose children are legitimate or legitimated, the Court is unable
85
86

Id. at 353.
Section 74-103 provides:
A father of an illegitimate child may render the same legtimate by petitioning the superior court of the county of this residence, setting forth name, age, and sex of such child,
and also the name of the mother; and if he desires the name changed, stating the new
name, and praying the legitimation of such child. Of this application the mother, if
alive, shall have notice. Upon such application, presented and filed, the court may pass
an order declaring said child to be legitimate, and capable of inheriting from the father
in the same manner as if born in lawful wedlock, and the name by which he or she shall
be known.

441 U.S. at 349 n.2.
87 That the child is the child of a particular woman is rarely difficult to prove. Proof of
paternity, by contrast, frequently is difficult when the father is not part of a formal
family unit. The putative father often goes his way unconscious of the birth of a child.
Even if conscious, he is very often totally unconcerned because of the absence of any

ties with the mother. Indeed the mother may not know who is responsible for her
pregnancy.
Id. at 355 n.7 (quoting Lalli, 439 U.S. at 268-9 (Powell, J.) (citations omitted from quote)).
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to establish that § 105-1307 invidiously discriminates against fathers as a
class. All that this statute does, according to the Court, is distinguish
"between those fathers who have legitimated their children and those
88
who have not."
By means of these statutory classifications, the state is able to maintain an efficient system for the disposition of property at death, for the
avoidance of fraudulent paternity claims, and for the settlement of
wrongful death litigation. Georgia's solution, embodied in § 105-1307,
was deemed by the Court to be "a rational means for dealing with the
89
problem of proving paternity" in wrongful death actions.
Justice Powell, on the other hand, would have affirmed the judgment of the Court, by using the sex discrimination test of Craig90 rather
than the rational basis test. He asserts that § 105-1307 recognizes real
differences between mothers and fathers in the difficulty of proving
parenthood:
[The] law is substantially related to the State's objective [of avoiding difficult problems of proving paternity after the death of an
illegitimate child]. It lies entirely with a father's power to remove
himself from the disability that only he will suffer. The father is
required to declare his intentions at a time when both the child
and its mother are likely to be available to provide evidence. The
mother, on the other hand, is given the opportunity to appear and
either support or rebut the father's claim of paternity. The marginally greater burden placed upon the father is no more severe
than is required by the marked difference between proving paternity and proving maternity-a difference we have recognized
repeatedly. 9 1
Justice White, in conjunction with Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and
Marshall, attacked both the state's contention that its interests are served
by § 105-1307 and the Court's casual acceptance of the blatant sex discrimination inherent in the statute. 92 Justice White directed attention to
88 Parham, 441 U.S. at 356. At this point the Court attempts to distinguish the case from Caban
by noting the differences between the two: the unwed father in Caban "could change neither his

children's status nor his own for purposes of the New York adoption statute;" the unwed father in
Parham could change both his and his children's status for purposes of the Georgia wrongful death
statute. Id. at 356 n.9.
89 Parham, 441 U.S. at 358. The Court ignores the question of whether § 105-1307 is rationally
related to the other two state interests-promoting the traditional family and setting a standard of

morality-without explanation. However, it can be assumed that since the Court has discovered a
rational connection between the statutory classification and at least one of the state's interests the
Court believes that the statute must be upheld. See infra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
90Craig, 429 U.S. 190. See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
91 Parham, 441 U.S. at 360 (citation omitted from quote).
92 Justice White argues that the sex discrimination in the wrongful death statute, which requires
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the fact that the father's failure to legitimize his child in this case was
incidental; it was only relevant because the mother was killed with the
child. If the mother were still alive, the father could not sue under § 1051307 regardless of whether his child was legitimated or legitimate.
Having conclusively established the existence of gender-based discrimination, Justice White proceeded to dismantle the state's argument
that the discrimination promotes its interests. With regard to the state's
first interest-problems of proving paternity-Justice White saw § 1051307 as not only ensuring the accuracy of the paternity claim, but also
serving as a prerequisite to recovery for a child's wrongful death. Consequently, individuals who could prove their paternity were nevertheless
forbidden to sue for damages under this statute-an outcome which Justice White could not accept as justifying the statute's discriminatory classification. Justice White would not concede that the possibility of
multiple recoveries in a tort case warrants the preclusion of individuals
who can establish their paternity beyond a doubt from participating in
the litigation for an illegitimate child's wrongful death. Less burdensome
alternatives are available to the state which would be more attuned to its
interests, and as such Justice White found § 105-1307 unjustified.
The state's second and third interests-promoting a legitimate family relationship and setting a moral standard-fared no better in Justice
White's estimation, for legitimation does not guarantee the formation of
a traditional family unit. Quoting from Glona, Justice White equated the
situation of the unmarried mother in Glona to the unmarried father in
Parham:
We see no possible rational basis. . . for assuming that if the natural mother is allowed recovery for the wrongful death of her illegitimate child, the cause of illegitimacy will be served. It would
indeed be farfetched to assume that women have illegitimate chil93
dren so that they can be compensated in damages for their death.
Based on this analysis, Justice White reached the conclusion that the
unwed fathers to pursue the legitimization procedure, is not alleviated by resorting to the fact that
under Georgian law only fathers may legitimate illegitimate children:
The plurality not only fails to examine whether required resort by fathers to the legitimation procedure bears more than a rational relationship to any state interest, but also
fails even to address the constitutionality of the sex discrimination in allowing fathers
but not mothers to legitimate their children. It is anomalous, at least, to assert that sex

discrimination in one statute is constitutionally invisible because it is tied to sex discrimination in another statute, without subjecting either of these classifications on the
basis of sex to an appropriate level of scrutiny.

Id. at 361-2 n.2.
93 Id. at 363 (quoting Glona, 391 U.S. at 75).
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relationship between the state's asserted interests and the classification in
§ 105-1307 is simply too weak to be validated.
III. EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS
The Court's twenty rulings on statutes which classify individuals on
the basis of their legal birth status cannot be accurately or adequately
characterized in terms of the rigid dichotomies traditionally utilized by
the Court-mere rationality or strict scrutiny. 94 This point is emphasized by Justice Marshall's San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez9 5 dissenting opinion:
[T]his Court's decisions in the field of equal protection defy such
easy categorization. A principled reading of what this Court has
done reveals that it has applied a spectrum of standards in reviewing discrimination allegedly violative of the Equal Protection
Clause. This spectrum clearly comprehends variations in the degree of care with which the Court will scrutinize particular classifications, depending

. .

on the constitutional

and societal

importance of the interest adversely affected and the recognized
invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular classification
is drawn. 96
94 See supra notes 61-3 and accompanying text. Under the minimum rationality test, which is
employed whenever economics or social welfare regulations are challenged, the Court demands reasonableness in legislative classifications. Generally, the Court will accord enormous deference to the
legislature whenever any conceivable justification can be offered by the government for the statutory
distinctions being imposed. Unless the classifications are arbitrarily overinclusive or under inclusive,
the Court will not invalidate a statute evaluated at this level of scrutiny. Hence, for all intents and
purposes, this test is "toothless." Strict scrutiny, on the other hand, usually results in the challenged
classification being declared unconstitutional, save in those exceptionally rare instances when the
government demonstrates a compelling reason for its existence. Invocation of this level of scrutiny is
almost always "fatal" however to legislative classifications which infringe on fundamental or preferred rights (i.e., rights which are legally protected against government interference or personal
freedom which are catalogued in the Bill of Rights) or to classification which possess "the traditional
indicia of suspectness" (i.e., "the class (defined by the classification) is... saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such (a) history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a
position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian
political process."). See G. GUNTHER & N. DOWING, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, at 185-209 (8th ed. 1973) (discussing
San Antonio Independent School District, 411 U.S. 1).
95 San Antonio Independent School District, 411 U.S. 1.
96 Id. at 98-9. Justice Marshall makes this same argument in his dissenting opinion in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471:
This case simply defies easy characterization in terms of one or the other of these (equal
Rather, concentration must be placed upon the character of
protection) "tests" ...
the classification in question, the relative importance to individuals in the class discriminated against of the governmental benefits that they do not receive, and the asserted
state interests in support of the classification.
Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 520-1. See also Gunther & Dowling, supra note 94 at 171.
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The "spectrum of standards" to which Justice Marshall refers allows for intermediate levels of scrutiny. Any time an important, though
not fundamental, right is violated, or a classification which affects a sensitive, but not suspect, class is employed, the Court relies upon the intermediate scrutiny standard. The Court attempts to balance the relevant
factors: "[the] facts and circumstances behind the law, the interests
which the State claims to be protecting, and the interests of those who
'97
are disadvantaged by the classification.
These factors are analyzed in terms of the five techniques which
characterize intermediate scrutiny: 98 (1) "assessing importance"-the
objective served by the classification is important, though not compelling;
(2) "close fit"-the means used by the government to achieve its objective are substantially related to the ends; (3) "current articulation"-the
refusal of the Court to supply an imagined or inferred rationale for a
challenged statute; (4) "limiting afterthought"-the rejection of the posthoc rationalizations; and (5) "permitting rebuttal"-the requirement that
legislators allow for exceptions to statutory distinctions which are over/
underinclusive.
Through intermediate scrutiny the Court possesses a high level of
flexibility which is unavailable under the other two standards. A prime
example is the Court's analysis of statutes affecting illegitimate children.
If the Court faithfully adhered to traditional equal protection analysis
(minimum scrutiny and strict scrutiny), it could not strictly scrutinize
classifications which discriminate on the basis of legitimacy, because the
Court has declined to include illegitimacy as a suspect class. 9 9 Therefore,
by default, these classifications would have to be judged according to the
rational basis test and upheld-despite their invidious effect-since a justification can always be found.
Under the intermediate standard, a broad continuum of possibilities
are at the Court's disposal. Nuances between similar circumstances can
be accommodated by the appropriate level of review. Such fine distinctions help to explain the discrepancy between the Court's decisions in
three sets of paired cases°°--Labine and Trimble; Trimble and Lalli;
and Caban and Parham.'0 Within each set, the Court invalidated a law
97 Kramer v. Union School District, 345 U.S. 621, (1969) (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S.
23, 30 (1968)) See also Gunther & Dowling, supra note 96.
98 L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, at 1082-9 (1978). It should be noted that
these techniques are not mutually exclusive. Hence a legislative distinction may be invalidated because it fails to satisfy a single technique or multiple technique.
" See supra notes 50-2 and accompanying text.
100 See supra notes 60-9, 89-95, and infra notes 116-8 and accompanying text.
1o In the first set, Labine, 401 U.S. 532 and Trimble, 430 U.S. 762, Justice Stewart provided the

swing vote to uphold a statute which had been invalidated in Labine. Three members of the Labine
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in one case which it upheld in the other.
Another explanation for the Court's seemingly inconsistent decisions would entail viewing these cases in terms of Weber's dual inquiry102--(1) the state interest promoted by the classification; (2) impact

of the classification on the fundamental rights of individuals. Most of the
Court's rulings hinge on a combination of the state's interest and/or the
impact of the classification.103 However, the Court has never relied
solely upon a classification's impact in reaching a decision.
Generally, the state seeks to advance one to three objectives through
a statutory classification: (a) to legislate proper parental conduct or to
uphold traditional moral standards with regard to extra-marital sexual
behavior, (b) to facilitate an orderly distribution of intestate estates, and/
or (c) to provide a just allocation of benefits from family support programs. Which of these three purposes is considered primary determines
whether the statutory classification is upheld or invalidated.
In thirteen of the illegitimacy cases which invalidate illegitimacy
laws, the objective which the state articulates and the Court rejects concerns the legislation of morality or the existence of insurmountable barriers, or the administration and allocation of benefits. Levy extends the
right of recovery under Article 2315 of the Louisiana Civil Code to illegitimate children for the wrongful death of their mother because the
challenged classification is "based on morals and general welfare because
it discourages bringing children into the world out of wedlock.' 1°4
Glona extends the right to recovery for damages to an illegitimate child
to an unwed mother because the justification for the classification is
grounded in the "sin" of birthing a child out of wedlock.105 Stanley extends to unwed fathers the right to a fitness hearing because "the aim of
the Juvenile Court Act is to protect 'moral, emotional, mental and physical welfare of the minor and the best interests of the community' and to
'strengthen the minor's family ties.'

.

..

"106

Weber extends recovery of

Court (Justices Black, Douglas, and Harlan) were replaced in the Trimble Court (Justices Powell,
Rehnquist, and Stevens). In set two, Trimble, and Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, Justices Powell and Stewart
were the swing votes, which allowed the statute upheld in Trimble to be invalidated in Lalli. In the
third set, Caban, 441 U.S. 380 and Parham, 441 U.S. 347, only Justice Powell swung his vote thereby
invalidating in Parham a statute which Caban had upheld.
102 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
103 See Caban, 441 U.S. 380, Parham, 441, U.S. 347, Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 and Mathews, 427 U.S.
495.
104 Levy, 391 U.S. at 70.
105 Glona, 391 U.S. at 75-6.
106 Stanley, 405 U.S. at 652 (plaintiff successfully challenged a statute which allowed a state to
remove illegitimate children from their father's custody without a hearing or proof regarding the
father's fitness while granting such a hearing or proof to parents of legitimate children and to unwed
mothers).
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workmen's compensation benefits to illegitimate children because the
10
' 7
avowed state interest is "protecting legitimate family relationships."
Davis increases the benefits payable to illegitimate children under the Social Security Act because the statutory distinction is intended to preserve
the [legitimate] family unit.108 Gomez extends the right of support from
their natural father to illegitimate children because the classification reinforces the societal condemnation of illegitimacy. 1o9 Griffin eliminates the
reduction of benefits payable to illegitimate children because the challenged provision served "to preserve the wage earner's family unit...
[by] foster[ing] the integrity and stability of that unit."' 10 Cahill extends
family assistance benefits to unwed parents because the statutory scheme
was established "to preserve and strengthen family life.""' Jimenez extends disability benefits to afterborn illegitimate children because the
purpose of the discriminatory classification is to "prevent spurious claims
and to ensure that only those actually entitle to benefits receive payments."1 2 (The articulated purpose in this case is the provision of a just
allocation of benefits, which fails to satisfy Tribe's 5th technique--"permitting rebuttal.")' " Beaty extends Social Security benefits to afterborn
illegitimate children because the classification's purpose is the same as in
Jimenez." 4 Trimble expands the right to intestate succession from fathers to illegitimate children because the statute seeks to promote "[legitimate] family relationships."' ' 5 Parham extends to unwed fathers the
right to veto their children's adoption because the statute seeks to
achieve a triply unacceptable purpose: to avoid proving paternity, to
6
promote a "legitimate family unit," and to set a standard of morality."
Clark extends survivor's benefits to illegitimate children because the pur107

Weber, 406 U.S. at 173.

108 Davis, 342 F. Supp. at 593 (constitutionality of § 203(a) of the Social Security Act as it af-

fected § 216(h)(3) of the same Act was disputed-§ 203(a) allowed for the proportional reduction of
benefits to those illegitimate children who qualify for benefits solely by means of § 216(h)(3)).
109 Gomez, 409 U.S. at 537-8 (the Court struck down a Texas law which granted to legitimate
children a right to support from their natural father while denying the same right to illegitimate
children).
110 Griffen, 346 F. Supp. at 1234.
IllNew Jersey Welfare Rights Organization, 411 U.S. at 620 (New Jersey Assistance to Families
of the Working Poor program was invalidated by the Court because the program limited benefits to a
"traditional" family and thereby excluded illegitimate children from receiving financial assistance
and other services provided under the program).
112 Jiminez, 417 U.S. at 633-4 (provisions of the Social Security Act were judged to be unconstitutional violations of the Equal Protection Clause because by being both under- and overinclusive, the
provisions discriminated between classes of illegitimate children).
113 See surpa note 96 and accompanying text.
114 Beaty, 478 F.2d at 307-8 (In Beaty, the Court addresses the same question as in Jimenez, 417
U.S. 628).
'isTrimble, 430 U.S. at 768.
116 Parham, 441 U.S. at 350.
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pose for the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children is
"administrative convenience." ' 1 7 (This case also contains the same articulated purpose and flaw as Jimenez and Beaty.)
The remaining seven cases uphold illegitimacy legislation and restrict the rights of illegitimate children and unwed parents. As a general
rule the Court accepts the state's justification for its classification if it
rests on either the facilitation of intestate estates, the just allocation of
benefits, or a child's welfare: Labine prohibits illegitimate children from
equally sharing in their father's estate because the classification serves the
state's interest in "[making] laws for the distribution of property left
within the State.""I 8 Mathews denies surviving child's insurance benefits
to illegitimate children because the design of the program is "to provide
for all children of deceased insureds who can demonstrate their 'need'
. . "119 Fiallo denies immigration preferences to illegitimate children
and unwed fathers because this classification reflects the absence of close
family ties and the problem of substantiating paternity claims.120 Quilloin denies unwed fathers authority to veto the child's adoption because
the distinction between wed and unwed fathers is grounded on the "best
interests of the child."' 2' Lalli denies illegitimate children intestate succession from their father because the goal of the statute "is to provide for
the just and orderly disposition of property at death."' 22 Parham precludes unwed fathers from recovering for their child's death because the
statute's purpose is to "maintain an accurate and efficient system for the
disposition of property at death."' 23 Boles denies mothers' insurance
benefits to unwed mothers because the distinction between wed and unwed mothers serves to ease the economic dislocation that occurs among
24
married couples when the wage earner dies.'
By categorizing these decisions, it becomes apparent that the seemingly inconsistent rulings reached by the Court in the triple-paired cases
(as well as the other 15) are in fact uniform-insofar as each set of cases
contains one classification through which the state primarily seeks to
minimize promiscuity by punishing the children resulting from non-sanctioned unions (Trimble and Caban), and one classification in which the
117 Clark, 445 U.S. at 27.
118 Labine, 401 U.S. at 539.

119Mathews, 427 U.S. at 507.
120 Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 799 (upheld a federal law which denied to illegitimate alien children of
American fathers the absolute right to immigrate).
121Quillion, 434 U.S. at 254.
122 Lalli, 439 U.S. at 268.
123 Parham, 441 U.S. at 357.

124Califano, 443 U.S. at 288-9 (the constitutionality of § 202(a)(1) of the Social Security Act,
which denies insurance benefits to illegitimate children and their mothers because their mothers
never married the wage earner who fathered the children, was upheld).
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state primarily seeks to promote a judicially approved governmental interest (Labine, Lalli, and Parham).
Finally, this assessment of these cases indicates the approximate location of all the challenged statutory classifications on the equal protection spectrum. The thirteen cases which invalidate the established
distinction lean towards the strict scrutiny end; the other seven lean towards the minimum scrutiny side. All are judged with intermediate
levels of scrutiny. (See Table III)
Unfortunately, the inherent fluidity of intermediate scrutiny produces a blurring effect. Because there are no clear boundaries between
points on the continuum, the language used by the Court in various instances tends to be confusing. Although the Court purports to be applying one standard, it uses the terms of another. A reconsideration of Levy
and Labine furnishes a representative illustration.1 25 Both cases appeal
to the rational basis test, but the Court's rationale contains elements of
strict scrutiny. This is repeated in almost every case, for regardless of
which standard the Court relies upon in its decision, elements of the
other standards are considered. This is evidenced in Levy by the Court's
reminder that invidious discrimination will not be tolerated, while in
Labine the Court notes the non-existence of insurmountable barriers. In
addition, both of these cases, as well as the other eighteen, utilize the
balancing approach formally vocalized in Weber, and weigh the state's
interest against the statutory impact.
Overall, the Court has favored the state's position in only 35% of
the illegitimacy cases it considered from 1968-1980. However, if the
Court's voting record is broken down into three time segments (1968;
1971-1974; and 1976-1980),126 the level of deference increases from 0%
to 12% to 66% in each time segment respectively. A possible explanation for this phenomenon is that the state and federal legislatures are
exercising more care when designing statutory distinctions to ensure that
the classification is firmly grounded on a legitimate government interest.
By following this practice the legislators can be fairly certain that the
classifications will withstand a constitutional challenge. The uncertainty
arises because there is no guarantee that the members of the Court will
be consistent from decision to decision.
Whether the various justices on the Court between 1968 and 1980
have maintained a consistent position can be determined from how they
12SSee supra notes 4-17 and accompanying text.
126

These dates are significant as they correspond to changes in Court's composition accompanied

by a high degree of deference to the state's alleged interests. 1968 ends the Warren Court's decisions
on illegitimacy; 1971 begins the Burger Court's illegitimacy rulings; 1976 marks the last personnel
change in the Court for that time frame under the consideration.
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voted in the sets of cases previously discussed (Labine and Trimble;
Trimble and Lalli; and Caban and Parham). The underlying assumption
is that since the Court's decisions in each set of cases are opposed but not
inconsistent with one another, members of the Court will not vote the
same way on both cases in any given set.
This expectation is fulfilled most of the time. (See Table I). While
this is a respectable number, it is hardly high enough to instill enormous
confidence in legislators that their laws will be upheld. This is especially
true given the closeness of the vote not only in these cases but in almost
all of the illegitimacy decisions. Certainty for the legislators is confined
to three things: (a) Justice Powell is the only Court member who always
votes with the majority, (b) Justice Rehnquist is the only member of the
Court who always votes that there is no equal protection violation, and
(c) the remainder of the Court is evenly divided on which equal protection standard to use. (See Tables II and III). Justices Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun and White advocate a stricter scrutiny of illegitimacy;
Justices Burger, Stevens, Stewart and Rehnquist support the rational basis test. Therefore the validity of any classification established by the
legislators may ultimately depend upon the inclination of Justice Powell-provided, of course, that the other justices adhere to their current
voting pattern. It should be noted however that only Justice Rehnquist
is 100% consistent-he always votes against the asserted equal protection claim. The only other justices whose level of consistency is extremely high are Justices Brennan, Marshall, and White who vote for the
equal protection claim asserted 90-95% of the time. (See Tables IV and
V).
Justice Powell seems uncommitted to either the rational basis test or
strict scrutiny as being the appropriate standard against which to measure illegitimacy statutes. Instead, he advocates intermediate scrutiny
and the brand of consistency resulting from such a standard-rejection
of statutes which legislate morality and acceptance of statutes which advance a legitimate state interest. But such a standard may not offer an
adequate sense of security to legislators, for in the process of balancing
the competent interests the intent of the challenged statute must first be
ascertained. Depending upon the Court's perception of the statute's primary purpose, the statutory discrimination against illegitimate children
will either be upheld or invalidated. The only way the legislatures can be
certain how the Court will react to distinctions drawn between legitimate
and illegitimate children is if the Court were to abandon intermediate
scrutiny and embrace either the rational basis test or strict scrutiny.
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IV. CONCLUSION

The ideal solution would be for the Court to enlarge the category of
suspect classifications and include illegitimacy. This would be justified
because illegitimate children (a) are politically powerless, (b) are characterized solely by their legal birth status over which they have no control
(the characterization is therefore immutable), (c) have historically suffered invidious discrimination, and (d) bear the stigma of inferiority and
a badge of societal opprobrium. By utilizing the strict scrutiny standard
the Court would compel legislators to protect the rights of illegitimate
children by granting them equal protection of the law. Moreover, it
would put legislators on notice that for the Court discrimination against
illegitimate children is totally unacceptable.
Unfortunately, the Court is unwilling to take such a firm stance on
illegitimacy. Instead it forces itself to remain in the uncomfortable posi27
tion of evaluating the precise accuracy of Congress' calculations' -it
struggles with statutes to determine whether a specific classification is
"substantially related" to the government's objective, or whether the
challenged distinction serves "an important governmental interest."
Such an approach requires the use of intermediate scrutiny if the Court
desires an honest assessment of a statutory discrimination.
While the use of intermediate scrutiny is not ideal, it is much better
than reliance upon the rational basis test. Indeed, if the Court's twenty
decisions from 1968-1980 are any indication of the Court's future decisions, intermediate scrutiny will protect the rights of illegitimate children
in the majority of instances. However, the Court should strive to protect
their rights in every instance by moving forward from intermediate scrutiny to strict scrutiny.
V.

AUTHOR'S ADDENDUM

Since the completion of this article, the Supreme Court has rendered
three decisions regarding illegitimacy-equal protection claims. 28 In all
three cases, the Court has employed intermediate scrutiny. The outcome
of these cases substantiates the categories proposed for the previous
1 29
twenty cases.

In a surprising decision by Justice Rehnquist in Mills, the Court
reversed a Texas statute barring paternity suits from being brought after
a child has reached the age of one.
127 Mathews, 427 U.S. at 515-6.
128Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Pickett v.

Brown et al., 462 U.S. 1 (1983).
129 See supra notes 101-122, at 84-87 and accompanying text.
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In Lehr, the Court held that a New York adoption statute that did
not provide that a putative father be notified of the adoption of his illegitimate son, although the state knew of the father's existence and whereabouts, did not violate the due process and the equal protection clauses.
In Pickett, the Court overturned a Tennessee statute requiring paternity and support cases to be brought within two years of a child's birth.
It should be noted that the Court's voting pattern has shifted only
slightly. The Court's overall deference to the state's position has not
changed, although the level of deference to the state in the third time
segment has decreased from 66% to 58%.130
The percentage of time that individual justices are in the majority
has also changed slightly. 13 1 The number of inconsistencies (excluding
those occuring in unanimous decisions) has increased to 11, while the
total number has become 13. This changes the CR score from .72 to
.73.132 Since these changes are nominal, the conclusions drawn in section
IV of this article remain intact.
130 See supra at 88.
131 Justices Powell- 100%; Burger- 80%; Blackmun- 76%; Stevens- 75%; White and Brennan74%; Marshall and Stewart- 70%; and Rehnquist- 47%. Compare these percentages to those in
Table III, infra at 95.
132 The CR= 1-t/s=l-.0728476= .93; the CS= 1-'3/43=1-.3023255=.70.
Compare
these figures with those of the previous twenty cases in Table II, infra at 92-3.
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Table III
Percentage of times justice voted in majority/minority
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Table IV
Percentage of times justice voted for equal protection
Justices:
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0

number of times justice voted for equal protection
divided by total number of cases in which justice
participated
percentage of times that justice voted for equal
protection

Supreme Court member in 1980.

1985]
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Table V
Interagreement Graph
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The above box represents a source matrix containing a complete record of non-unanimous votesfor all illegitimacy-equal protection casesfrom 1968-1980. The numbers in the upper-right corner represent the raw frequency of votes (rather than percentages), and
reflect how any two justices voted in the total number of casesin which the pair participated. A positive sign (+) indicates a majority
opinion vote and a negative sign (-) indicates a minority opinion vote.
The numbers in the lower-left corner reflect the interagreement scores (I.A.) of pairs of justices, which is a measure of the
proportion of times, (in percentages) two members of any pair voted together in either the majority or minority, out of the total
number of casesin which both justices participated.
This information makes it possible to identify voting blocs within the Court by summing the interagreement scores (I.A.) for all
justices in a given bloc and dividing by the number of pairs in the bloc. The most obvious voting bloc consists of Justices MarshallBrennan-White (M-B-W) with an I.A. score of of 97%. A less obvious bloc would be Justices Burger-Stewart-Rehnquist (Bu-S-R)
with an I.A. score of 65%. Justice Powell agreed with the M-B-W block 83% and with the Bu-S-R bloc 62%; Justice Blackmun
agreed with the M.B-W block 81% and with the Bu-S-R bloc 57%; Justice Stevens agreed with the M-B-W bloc 71% and with the
Bu-S-R bloc 59%. The I.A. score of all the members of the Court is 53%.
Since 1973,the IA. score for the M-B-W bloc is 92% and for the Bu-S-R bloc is 84%. When other members of the Court are
added to these blocs, the l.A. scores are as follows: M-B-W+Stevens=69%; Bu-S-R+Stevens=67%; M-B-W+Blackmun=78%;
Bu-S-R+Blackman=67%, M-B-W+Powell=67%; Bu-S-R+Powell=77%. [For the purposes of predictability, an I.A. score >
70% represents a high level of interagreement between justices; 60-69% is moderate; and < 60% is low.]
Source:

S. KRISLOR, LITTLE BROWNMANUAL IN POLITICAL ANALYSIS: JUDICIAL PROCESS AND CONSTiTUTIONAL LAW-A
LABRATORYAPPROACH131-141(1972).

